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September 2 5 , 1990 
Ms. Mary Noonan 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Re: State v. John Quas 
Case No. 890601-CA 
I am writing this letter pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24 (j), in an effort to follow through with 
comments made during oral argument yesterday in this case. 
As indicated at oral argument, I am enclosing copies of 
two cases in support of the assertion that defense counsel's 
filing the motion to quash the bindover order in the district 
court was a reasonable action at that time, and should not be 
construed as a waiver of the bindover issue. Heninger v. Ninth 
Circuit Court, 739 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1987), is the case relied on 
by defense counsel at trial, for the proposition that the 
district court had jurisdiction over quashal of the bindover, as 
part of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Boggess v. Morris, 
635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981), discusses the breadth of the common law 
extraordinary writ jurisdiction. 
As indicated yesterday, defense counsel's assertion of 
the Heninger case is recorded in the transcript of the pretrial 
motions, on page 7. I am enclosing a copy of her discussion of 
the issue. 
Ms. Mary Noonan 
August 31, 1990 
Page Two 
At oral argument, I indicated probable agreement with 
Judge Orme,s characterization of my argument as one advocating a 
prospective, rather than retroactive, application of State v. 
Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah App. 1990). As authority for this 
argument, I am attaching a copy of State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 
1100 (Utah 1977). Mr. Quas relies on the following language, 
appearing on page 1102 of that decision: 
If there is to be such a change in the law, whether by 
legislative act or by judicial decision, it seems that 
it should have only prospective effect and that fairness 
and good conscience require that it should not be 
applied retroactively to adversely affect rights as they 
existed at the time a particular controversy arose. 
EH:kll 
Enclosures 
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HALL, CJ , STEWART, A.CJ., and 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
H.C. HENINGER and Doris W. 
Heninger, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF 
UTAH, WASHINGTON COUNTY, St. 
George Department, and Robert F. 
Owens, Circuit Judge, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 20976. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 9, 1987. 
Bondsmen brought petition for ex-
traordinary writ for review of order of 
circuit court forfeiting bonds in drunk driv-
ing cases, based on failure of defendants to 
pay fines, and for writ of prohibition bar-
ring enforcement of revocation of their 
bonding authority. The Fifth District 
Court, Washington County, J. Harlan 
Burns, J., granted summary judgment in 
favor of bondsmen, holding that bonds 
were exonerated at time of sentence and 
that bondsmen were entitled to notice and 
hearing on revocation of bonding authority. 
Appeal was brought. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, J., held that (1) bondsmen were 
entitled to proceed by petition for extraor-
dinary writ; (2) bonds were exonerated at 
time of surrender for execution of sen-
tence, where no further appearances by 
defendants were required, except as to one 
defendant who failed to appear for execu-
tion; and (3) bondsmen were entitled to 
notice, hearing and reasoned explanation of 
1. Bail <s=*77(l) 
A bond forfeiture is reviewable on ap-
peal from a final judgment, but, standing 
alone, the order is not appealable. 
2. Courts <3=>207.1 
Bondsmen were entitled to petition for 
extraordinary writ to review bond forfei-
ture rulings of circuit court based on fail-
ure of defendants to pay fines in drunk 
driving proceedings, since no appeal of un-
derlying convictions was sought, and no 
direct appeal of forfeiture orders was thus 
available. 
3. Courts <s>207.1 
Elimination by statutory amendment 
of supervisory control of district court over 
circuit courts did not curtail constitutional 
authorization for district court's issuance 
of "all extraordinary writs," and district 
court was authorized thereunder to issue 
extraordinary writ reversing circuit court's 
forfeiture of bail bonds and enjoining cir-
cuit court's revocation of bondsmen's bond-
ing authority. U.C.A.1953, 78-1-1 et seq., 
78-3-4; Const Art 8, §§ 1 et seq., 5. 
4. Bail <*=>75.2(2) 
Statute extending liability of bonds-
men for defendants' appearances "up to 
and including surrender of the defendant in 
execution of any sentence imposed" extend-
ed bondsmen's liability beyond imposition 
of sentence to point of defendants' appear-
ing and surrendering themselves to serve 
their sentences. U.C.A.1953, 77-20-7(1). 
5. Bail «=>75.2(2) 
Bondsmen were liable under bond for 
court appearances of drunk driving defend-
ants to point of defendants' surrender to 
serve their jail sentences, but bonds were 
thereafter exonerated as to defendants, 
with exception of one defendant who failed 
to appear for execution of sentence, and 
bondsmen were not liable for forfeiture of 
bonds upon subsequent failure of defend-
ants to pay fines during their periods of 
probation. U.C.A.1953, 77-20-7(1). 
Cite as 739 P.2d 
nation of court's decision prior to revoca-
tion of their bonding authority. 
David L. Wilkinson and Diane Wilkins, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appel-
lants. 
Gary Pendleton and Paul Graf, St. 
George, for plaintiffs and respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
This is an appeal of a summary judgment 
granted by the Fifth District Court on a 
petition for an extraordinary writ In 
granting the writ, the district court re-
versed the Ninth Circuit Court's forfeiture 
of four bail bonds and enjoined the circuit 
court's revocation of respondents' bonding 
authority. 
Respondents H. C. and Doris Heninger 
were authorized bondsmen for the Ninth 
Circuit Court They filed undertakings of 
bail with that court in four separate drunk 
driving cases. Each of the defendants 
pleaded guilty and were sentenced to sixty 
days in the county jail and to pay a fine and 
a surcharge. In each case, fifty-eight days 
of the sentence were suspended and the 
defendant was put on probation. Three of 
the four defendants surrendered them-
selves to the Washington County Jail to 
serve the remaining two days. The fourth 
failed to appear for execution of the sen-
tence. Not one of the four defendants paid 
the fine. 
Bond forfeiture hearings were held, and 
all four bonds were forfeited. The circuit 
court ruled that the bonds continued in 
force during probation until all terms of 
the sentences had been satisfied. Respon-
dents sought review of the forfeiture order 
in Fifth District Court by extraordinary 
^rit They also sought a declaration of the 
duration of a bondsman's liability. The 
day after respondents' petition was filed, 
the circuit judge sent a letter to the Wash-
ington County sheriff instructing him to no 
longer accept bonds from respondents. 
Respondents amended their petition to seek 
* writ of prohibition barring enforcement 
of the revocation of their bonding authori-
ty. 
JLIVV 
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On motion for summary judgment, the 
district court held that an order revoking 
respondents' bonding authority was prohib-
ited unless and until they were provided 
notice of the basis for the revocation and 
were given a full hearing on their qualifica-
tions to act as bondsmen in the circuit 
court The court further decreed by way 
of declaratory judgment that the obligation 
of a bondsman is fulfilled by the production 
of the defendant at all times required by 
the court, up to and including the imposi-
tion of sentence, at which time the bond is 
exonerated by operation of law. Based on 
this reasoning, respondents were released 
from liability on the four bonds. 
[1,2] The first issue is whether the dis-
trict court erred in granting extraordinary 
relief. Appellants maintain that the proper 
avenue for relief would have been by direct 
appeal of the forfeiture ruling to the dis-
trict court, and since respondents did not 
lodge such an appeal, they should have 
been precluded from seeking extraordinary 
relief. This argument must fail. Under 
our case law, a bond forfeiture order is 
reviewable on appeal from a final judg-
ment, but standing alone, the order is not 
appealable. People v. Tremayne, 3 Utah 
331, 3 P. 85 (1884). Where no appeal of the 
conviction was sought and no direct appeal 
of the forfeiture order was thus available, 
the district court did not err in allowing 
respondents to proceed by petition for an 
extraordinary writ. 
[3] Appellants also claim that the dis-
trict court improperly exercised supervi-
sory power over the circuit court by issuing 
the writ Both article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution (the judicial article) and title 
78 of the Utah Code (the judicial code) have 
undergone substantial revisions since this 
action was filed. Among the many amend-
ments that have been made, the language 
specifically granting the district court su-
pervisory control over inferior courts was 
eliminated from article VIII and title 78. 
Appellants argue that the elimination of 
that language prevents the district court 
from granting the extraordinary relief 
sought in this case. We do not agree. 
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commenced, the district court clearly had 
power to issue extraordinary writs. Noth-
ing in the amendments to the judicial arti-
cle of the constitution or the judicial code 
stripped the court of that power. The pow-
er of the district court to issue "all extraor-
dinary writs'1 is found in the language of 
the constitution and statutes both prior and 
subsequent to the recent amendments. 
The elimination of the "supervisory con-
trol" language was made in preparation of 
the shifting of direct appeals of circuit 
court judgments from the district court to 
the court of appeals. However, eliminating 
the supervisory control of the district court 
over circuit courts does not curtail the ex-
ercise of powers granted the district court, 
by constitutional provision (article VIII, 
section 5) and statute (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3-4 (1987)), to issue "all extraordinary 
writs/' 
[4] Appellants next contend that the 
district court misread Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-20-7(1) (1982), which defines the dura-
tion of liability on an undertaking of bail. 
It provides: 
The principal and the sureties on the 
written undertaking are liable thereon 
during all proceedings and for all ap-
pearances required of the defendant up 
to and including the surrender of the 
defendant in execution of any sentence 
imposed irrespective of any contrary pro-
vision in the undertaking. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The district court in the declaratory judg-
ment portion of its order held that "the 
obligation of the bondsman is fulfilled by 
the producing of the person . . . up to and 
including the time of sentence and that the 
bail bond is exonerated upon the imposi-
tion of the Court's sentence." (Emphasis 
added.) This interpretation of the above 
statute is in error. The statute extends 
liability for all appearances "up to and in-
cluding surrender of the defendant in exe-
cution of any sentence imposed." This 
phrase clearly indicates an intent to extend 
liability beyond the imposition of sentence. 
[5] Appellants urge that all the terms 
of the sentence, including pajnnents of any 
fine imposed, and any other terms of pro-
bation must be fulfilled before the bond is 
exonerated. We disagree. City of Atlan-
ta v. Turner, 8 Ga.App. 213, 68 S.E. 847 
(1910), is illustrative of the problem in the 
instant case. There the defendant was sen-
tenced to one week on the chain gang and. 
to pay a fine. He served the sentence but 
failed to pay the fine. In affirming the 
lower court's refusal to order forfeiture of 
the bond, the Georgia Court held that "the 
prisoner having personally appeared and 
surrendered himself into custody for pun-
ishment in accordance with the sentence, 
the bondsman was discharged from further 
liability. The other obligor, the prisoner, 
remains liable for the fine." 
If a defendant is sentenced to incarcera-
tion and ordered to surrender himself at a 
particular time and place to a court-desig-
nated authority, the bond remains in force 
to assure "surrender in execution of sen-
tence." However, the bondsman is liable 
only for "all appearances required of the 
defendant." He is not liable for payment 
of the defendant's fine, nor is he liable for 
the defendant's fidelity to the terms of his 
probation. While the bondsman is given 
power to arrest the defendant in order to 
insure his appearance, he is not given pow: 
ers that would allow him to enforce pay-
ment of a fine or coerce particular behavior 
required by the terms of probation. Where 
no further appearance is required of the 
defendant, the bondsman has fulfilled his 
contractual and statutory obligation and is 
entitled to exoneration of the bond. 
In the instant case, when defendants 
Samuel Benally, Jonathan Marshall, and 
Dennis Ashcroft appeared and served their 
two-day sentences, the bondsmen were en-
titled to exoneration of the bonds since 
those defendants appeared "in execution of 
sentence." Conversely, when Jeffrey 
Greening failed to appear as required by 
the court, his bond was properly forfeited. 
*.*.•*** • i • A£TKJum> JL 
Cite as 739 P.2d 1111 (UtahApp. 1987) 
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takings of bail in their courts. In the exer-
cise of that power, appellants argue, notice 
of and hearing on the revocation of respon-
dents' bonding authority was not required. 
We disagree. The inherent power of the 
court to authorize and regulate bondsmen 
should be exercised in a fair and open 
manner, avoiding any appearance of arbi-
trariness. This can only be accomplished 
by notice to affected persons, giving them 
an opportunity to be heard, and a reasoned 
explanation of the court's decision. Any 
procedure short of this could adversely re-
brought action against former owners and 
one of former owner corporation's judg-
ment creditors after he discovered the 
judgment creditors claimed to have judg-
ment lien on property. The 3rd District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Scott Daniels, J., 
dismissed complaint against all defendants, 
and property owner appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that (1) judg-
ment creditors had valid judgment lien to 
extent of 30% of undivided one-third inter-
est in parcels described in deed from for-
mer owner to corporation, and (2) former 
fleet upon the judiciary and its processes, owner who deeded land to debtor corpora-
We hold that the circuit court abused its 
discretion in not providing notice and hear-
ing prior to termination of respondents' 
bonding authority. We consequently af-
firm that part of the summary judgment 
barring termination of respondents' bond-
ing authority without notice and hearing. 
We reverse that part dealing with bonds-
man's liability. The order exonerating the 
bonds is also reversed and remanded with 
directions to exonerate only the bonds of 
Benally, Marshall, and Ashcroft, who ap-
peared to serve their jail sentences. 
HALL, C.J., STEWART, Associate 
CJ., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, 
JJ., concur. 
( O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Alan D. FRANDSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
C. Don HOLLADAY, Ben Timmons, 
Keith Biesinger, The Mobile Home Lot, 
Inc., Estell Corporation, Inc., Max 
Laub and Eva Lou Laub, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 860069-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 10, 1987. 
Part owner of parcel of real property 
tion was not liable to new owner in amount 
equal to judgment lien. 
Affirmed. 
Greenwood, J., concurred in result 
only. 
1. Judgment G=>793(1) 
Judgment creditors of corporation had -
valid judgment lien to extent of 30% of 
undivided one-third interest in parcels of 
property, one third of which had originally 
been deeded in three equal shares of equal 
owners of corporation, after one owner 
deeded his interest back to corporation. 
2. Judgment ^793(1) 
Former owner of portion of land who 
conveyed interest in property to corpora-
tion, thus subjecting property to judgment 
lien against corporation, was not liable to 
subsequent purchaser of land in amount 
equal to judgment lien based upon failure 
to inform purchaser of existence of lien, 
though former owner did not file answer to 
action, where default judgment against him 
was never entered, and owner, with his 
attorney, proceeded to trial without giving 
indication that appearance was limited in 
scope nor was objection made to court's 
lack of personal jurisdiction, and causes of 
action were dismissed. 
Alan D. Frandsen, Salt Lake City, pro se. 
Bryan C. Robinson, (appeared for oral 
argument onlv). Salt IAICP fKtv f™« J^^^A 
Walter Preston BOGGESS, Jr., Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Lawrence MORRIS, Warden, Utah State 
Prison, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 16894. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 20, 1981. 
Appeal was taken from an order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay 
E. Banks, J., which granted defendant's 
writ of habeas corpus, which released him 
from custody and vacated his manslaughter 
conviction. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., 
held that where facts proven at hearing on 
defendant's petition for writ of habeas cor-
pus established that defendant, a convicted 
felon, had been denied his constitutional 
right to appeal his conviction within time 
prescribed by law, the Supreme Court 
would issue common-law writ of certiorari 
to bring up the record and allow defendant 
a direct review of alleged evidence in his 
trial for manslaughter just as if he had 
taken an appeal within the statutory period 
and the Supreme Court would vacate order 
of district court granting defendant's writ 
of habeas corpus, releasing him from custo-
dy and vacating his conviction subject to 
reprosecution. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Criminal Law <$=> 1077.3 
Unless relieved by court, appointed 
counsel is responsible to continue his or her 
representation through appeal if defendant 
requests an appeal before statutory time 
has expired, unless counsel, after a consci-
entious examination, finds the appeal to be 
wholly frivolous and, in that event, counsel 
must nevertheless pursue the procedure 
outlined in Anders v. California. 
2. Habeas Corpus *=> 113(13) 
Where facts proven at hearing on de-
fAnHant'q nptitinn for writ of habeas comus 
BOGGESS v. MORRIS uian ay 
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established that defendant, a convicted fel-
on, had been denied his constitutional right 
to appeal his conviction within time pre-
scribed by law, Supreme Court would issue 
common-law writ of certiorari to bring up 
the record and allow defendant a direct 
review on the record of his conviction for 
manslaughter just as if he had taken an 
appeal within the statutory period and 
Court would vacate order of district court 
granting defendant's writ of habeas corpus, 
releasing him from custody and vacating his 
conviction subject to reprosecution. U.C.A. 
1953, 76-1-405, 77-59-5; ConstArt 8, § 4. 
3. Certiorari <s=»9 
Common-law certiorari is a discretion-
ary writ. ConstArt. 8, § 4. 
4. Certiorari <e=>9 
Supreme Court, in common with all 
courts having power to issue writs of certio-
rari, may exercise a reasonable discretion in 
granting or refusing a writ; however, that 
discretion must be used sparingly so as not 
to undermine legislative authorizations fix-
ing limits on time and manner of appellate 
review. ConstArt 8, § 4. 
5. Certiorari <s=»ll 
Certiorari is available in aid of an ap-
pellate court's supervision of actions of in-
ferior courts, especially in implementing 
process of appellate review. ConstArt. 8, 
§4 . 
David L. Wilkinson, Craig L. Barlow, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant 
Douglas E. Wahlquist, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent 
OAKS, Justice: 
The issue in this appeal from the grant-
ing of a writ of habeas corpus is whether a 
convicted felon who has admittedly been 
denied his constitutional right to appeal his 
conviction within the time prescribed by 
law should have his conviction set aside by 
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collateral attack and be released from cus-
tody (subject to the state's right to prose-
cute him in another trial) or whether there 
is another, more appropriate, remedy by 
which he could have a direct appellate re-
view of the alleged errors at his trial. 
Defendant Boggess was charged with 
second-degree murder in the shooting of his 
wife. After a trial in which he was repre-
sented by appointed counsel, a jury convict-
ed him of the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter, and he was sentenced on 
June 19, 1978, to one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. On January 3, 1979, 
almost seven months later, defendant filed 
notice of appeal to this Court (No. 16232), 
urging error (1) in the court's failure to 
instruct on the lesser included offense of 
negligent homicide (as well as manslaugh-
ter), (2) in the court's failure to declare a 
mistrial because of the alleged bias of one 
of the jurors, and (3) in appointed counsel's 
ineffective representation at trial by failing 
to pursue the two foregoing errors by ap-
propriate requests or motions to the court. 
Aside from the cryptic claim in defend-
ant's brief that he had "obtained permission 
to file this appeal by writ of habeas corpus 
granted December 29, 1978," neither the 
parties' briefs on appeal nor the record 
(which contained no mention of a habeas 
corpus proceeding) disclosed any facts ex-
plaining why defendant's appeal was sub-
mitted so far out-of-time. The one-month 
period for appeal in criminal cases (U.C.A., 
1953, § 77-39-5) being jurisdictional, this 
Court dismissed defendant's appeal without 
addressing the merits of his alleged errors 
at trial. State v. Boggess, Utah, 601 P.2d 
927 (1979). 
The record in the current appeal (No. 
16894) discloses the following uncontested 
facts developed in a hearing at which de-
fendant and his appointed counsel testified. 
After his conviction and again at the time 
of his sentencing, defendant advised his ap-
pointed counsel that he did not want to 
appeal. After he arrived at the state pris-
on, defendant changed his mind and desired 
an appeal to urge that the jury should have 
been instructed on the lesser included of-
fense of negligent homicide as well as man-
slaughter. On July 11, 1978, defendant 
mailed a letter addressed to his trial counsel 
in care of the county clerk, asking him to 
take an appeal. Forwarded by the clerk, 
this letter reached counsel on July 18th, the 
day before the time for appeal expired. 
Counsel testified that he took no action on 
the letter because he felt that his appoint-
ment had terminated with the sentencing 
because defendant had then advised him 
that he did not want to take an appeal, and 
because prior to trial, after full explanation 
of the alternatives, defendant had approved 
his pursuing only the manslaughter alterna-
tive (defendant denies this), which the jury 
had accepted. 
[1] Counsel erred in not filing the notice 
of appeal in this case. Unless relieved by 
the court, appointed counsel is responsible 
to continue his or her representation 
through appeal if the defendant requests an 
appeal before the statutory time has ex-
pired, unless counsel, after a conscientious 
examination, finds the appeal to be "wholly 
frivolous." In that event, counsel must 
nevertheless pursue the procedure outlined 
in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,744,87 
S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1966), and 
followed by this Court in numerous cases.1 
[2] Following a hearing on defendant's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
District Court for the Third Judicial Dis-
trict, the court ruled in December, 1978, 
that defendant had been denied his right to 
appeal and his right to counsel. By stipula-
tion of counsel, the court then entered an 
order granting defendant permission to file 
an out-of-time appeal and directing him to 
return to the district court for further relief 
if this Court refused to entertain that ap-
peal. 
After defendant's appeal was dismissed 
by this Court, defendant returned to the 
BOGGESS v. MORRIS 
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district court for relief by habeas corpus. 
After another hearing solely concerned 
with the circumstances surrounding defend-
ant's attempted appeal and without any 
review of the alleged errors at his trial, the 
court ordered on December 10, 1979, "that 
if the Utah Supreme Court does not take 
jurisdiction of the substantive merits of an 
appeal by petitioner within thirty (30) days 
of December 6, 1979, petitioner's Petition 
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus will be grant-
ed and petitioner will be released from the 
custody of the Utah State Prison." This 
order also noted that if he was released in 
this manner petitioner could be re-prose-
cuted under the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 76-1-405. Pursuant to the provisions of 
this order, defendant's conviction was va-
cated and he was released from custody on 
January 6,1980. The state has pursued this 
appeal (No. 16894) from that order. 
Being unable to ignore the manifest deni-
al of defendant's constitutional right to an 
appeal from his conviction and to the assist-
ance of counsel in that appeal,2 and having 
no authority to grant an out-of-time appeal 
to this Court, the district court had no 
practical alternative other than to grant the 
order appealed from.3 At the same time, 
the vacating of a criminal conviction not 
shown to be erroneous and the consequent 
release of a convicted felon—even subject 
to re-trial—is a result that cannot be ac-
cepted if there is any practical and legal 
alternative. The ends of justice demand 
that a convicted defendant have an oppor-
2. E. g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 
S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 
811 (1963). 
3. An alternate order such as the trial court 
granted in this case has been approved and 
applied in comparable cases where defendant's 
rights to an appeal have been denied. E. g.t 
Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206, 71 S.Ct 
262, 95 L.Ed. 215 (1951); Pate v. Holman, 341 
F.2d 764, 777 (5th Cir., 1965); Patterson v. 
Medberry, 290 F.2d 275 (10th Cir., 1961). 
In view of the denial of an appeal, the district 
court might have used its habeas corpus hear-
ing to review the alleged trial errors on the 
merits and, if it found error, to order defendant 
released unless a new trial was granted within 
a prescribed time. But this course of action 
tunity to appeal in timely fashion, but once 
the appellate process" has concluded, socie-
ty's interest in the effectiveness and integ-
rity of the criminal justice system requires 
a finality of judgment that should severely 
limit repetitive appeals and collateral at-
tacks.4 
The odd result produced by the turn of 
the habeas corpus merry-go-round in this 
case is evident from the positions of the 
parties on this appeal: Defendant argues 
that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant 
him an out-of-time appeal to consider his 
claims of trial error on their merits. He 
says his release must be affirmed and he 
must go free unless the state elects to con-
duct another trial. The state argues that 
this Court should find a way to grant de-
fendant an out-of-time appeal on the mer-
its, suggesting that we apply the unique 
California doctrine of "constructive filing" 
of the notice of appeal in circumstances 
where the defendant did all that he could to 
perfect his appeal but the effort fell short 
of complying with jurisdictional require-
ments through the fault or inaction of oth-
ers or through circumstances beyond his 
control.5 
We decline to adopt either of these posi-
tions. The argument that the courts have 
no alternative other than to release a de-
fendant in circumstances where an appeal 
has been denied through the inaction of 
appointed counsel is particularly unaccepta-
ble since it could lend itself to manipulation 
by defendant and his counsel (although 
would offend the well-settled principle that "a 
habeas corpus proceeding is not intended as a 
substitute for an appeal [cite] and will not lie in 
the absence of a claim of fundamental unfair-
ness in the trial or a substantial and prejudicial 
denial of a person's constitutional rights." 
Morishita v. Morris, Utah, 621 P.2d 691, 693 
(1980); Gentry v. Smith, Utah, 600 P.2d 1007 
(1979). 
4. See, e. g., Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 
Annual Report to the American Bar Associa-
tion, Feb. 8, 1981. 
5. -Re Benoit, 10 Cal.3d 72, 109 Cal.Rptr. 785, 
514 P.2d 97 (1973); People v. Dailey, 175 Cai. 
App.2d 101, 345 P.2d 558 (1959); People v. 
Slobodian, 30 Cal.2d 362, 181 P.2d 868 (1947). 
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there is no such evidence in this case). For-
tunately, there are better alternatives, 
which further the interests of justice in 
promoting the full and fair review of crimi-
nal convictions on their merits, minimize 
the use of habeas corpus as a collateral 
attack upon or as a means of reviewing 
alleged errors in a criminal conviction, and 
obviate the expense of holding a new trial 
where the first trial has not been shown to 
be unacceptable. 
In State v. Johnson, Utah, 635 P.2d 36, 
a companion case, we have held that a claim 
that a convicted defendant has been denied 
his constitutional right to an appeal should 
be presented to the sentencing court by a 
motion for postconviction relief under Rule 
65B(i), U.R.C.P. If the facts found by the 
district court establish that the right to 
appeal was denied, that court is then em-
powered to resentence the defendant nunc 
pro tunc upon the previous finding of guilt 
so as to afford him an opportunity to prose-
cute a timely direct appeal from his convic-
tion. That is the appropriate remedy in the 
common circumstance where, as in the 
Johnson case, defendant's claim is based on 
allegations that have not been established 
as facts. 
In the unusual circumstances of this case, 
where the facts have already been estab-
lished by findings in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, it would be needlessly circular to 
require that defendant return to the district 
court to re-establish the facts by a postcon-
viction hearing and then to be resentenced 
to qualify for a direct appeal. In this ex-
ceptional circumstance, there is a more di-
rect remedy. 
Article VIII, Section 4, of the Utah Con-
stitution empowers this Court to issue the 
writ of certiorari. This constitutional lan-
guage refers to the writ defined by the 
common law, not the process limited by 
various statutory enactments authorizing 
specialized uses of the writ of certiorari or 
writ of review.6 The scope of review by the 
6. E. g., U.C.A., 1953, §§ 35-1-86 (workmen's 
compensation awards), 54-7-16 (public service 
commission orders); Utah Revised Statutes, 
common-law writ of certiorari was very 
broad, encompassing not just questions of 
jurisdiction but aJso a review of the evi-
dence and the regularity of the proceedings 
to determine whether the "proceedings 
were had in accordance with law," and to 
correct "errors in law affecting the substan-
tial rights of the parties." Gilbert v. Board 
of P. and F. Comm'rs, 11 Utah 378, 389, 396, 
40 P. 264 (1895); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 
42, 44-45, 65 S.Ct 517, 519-520, 89 L.Ed. 
739 (1945); Rex v. Northumberland Com-
pensation Appeal Tribunal, [1952] 1 K.B. 
338, 346, 348. 
[3-5] Common-law certiorari is a discre-
tionary writ. As this Court observed in 
Rohwer v. District Court, 41 Utah 279, 293, 
125 P. 671 (1912): "This Court, in common 
with all courts having the power to issue 
writs of certiorari, may exercise a reasona-
ble discretion in granting or refusing a 
writ" That discretion must be used spar-
ingly so as not to undermine legislative 
authorizations fixing limits on the time and 
manner of appellate review. At the same 
time, certiorari is available in aid of an 
appellate court's supervision of the actions 
of inferior courts, especially in implement-
ing the process of appellate review. As the 
United States Supreme Court declared in 
McClellan v. Garland, 211 U.S. 268, 279, 30 
S.Ct 501, 503, 54 L.Ed. 762 (1910): 
While the power to grant this writ [of 
certiorari] will be sparingly used, as has 
been frequently declared by this court, 
we should be slow to reach a conclusion 
which would deprive the court of the 
power to issue the writ in proper cases to 
review the action of the Federal courts 
inferior in jurisdiction to this court. 
This Court applied that principle in Higgins 
v. Burton, 64 Utah 550, 553, 232 P. 917 
(1924), where it allowed a writ of certiorari 
at the request of the district attorney to 
review an order quashing an information 
because the lower court's order was not 
Compiled Laws, 1917, § 7377, applied in Hilton 
Bros. Motor Co. v. District Court, 82 Utah 372, 
25 P.2d 595 (1933); Haliowell v. District Court, 
Cite as, Utah, 
subject to appellate review by any other 
means. 
At common law, the writ of certiorari 
was often used in company with the writ of 
habeas corpus to permit a higher court to 
review the proceedings of an inferior tribu-
nal.7 Together, it was sometimes said, they 
could be used for the same purpose as a 
writ of error to review the proceedings of a 
court over which the issuing court had ap-
pellate jurisdiction.8 
In this case, we have a criminal convic-
tion that is no longer subject to review by 
the statutory remedy of appeal and a habe-
as corpus proceeding—properly before this 
Court on appeal—which has shown that the 
conviction cannot stand without granting 
the defendant his constitutional right to an 
appeal. In that circumstance, where this 
Court has appellate jurisdiction over the 
habeas corpus proceeding and original juris-
diction to issue the writ of certiorari for the 
record in the criminal conviction, the effect 
of the two writs can unite to open the door 
for direct review of a criminal conviction in 
this Court. 
If available as an alternate means of 
appellate review, these two writs could 
make a mockery of the time limits for ap-
peal, undermine the finality of criminal 
judgments, and promote the indefensible 
merry-go-round of collateral attack. That 
must not be. We stress that this is not a 
case where the alleged error could have 
been corrected on appeal.9 The error in this 
case goes to the availability of the appeal. 
Nor is this a case where the time for appeal 
had passed before defendant took the initia-
tive to seek an appeal, so that an out-of-
time review would constitute an evasion of 
the statutory period for appeal. 
In the extraordinary circumstances of 
this case, where a timely appeal to this 
Court was prevented by circumstances that 
7. See generally, D. Oaks, The Original Writ of 
Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 
Sup.Ct.Rev. 153, 182-89; D. Oaks, Habeas Cor-
pus in the States—1776-1865, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 
243, 259-60 (1965). As a means of review, the 
two writs were complementary. Habeas cor-
pus produced the presence of the prisoner but 
not the record; certiorari produced the record 
635P.2d43 
admittedly constituted a denial of defend-
ant's constitutional rights to appeal, we ex-
ercise our discretion to issue the common-
law writ of certiorari to bring up the record 
and allow defendant a direct review in this 
Court of the alleged errors in his trial for 
manslaughter, on the merits, just as if he 
had taken an appeal within the statutory 
period. The briefs filed by the parties in 
No. 16232 are hereby received as the briefs 
in this case, with either party to have leave 
to supplement them within thirty days. 
For the reasons set out above, we also 
vacate the order of the district court grant-
ing defendant a writ of habeas corpus, re-
leasing him from custody and vacating his 
conviction, and remand this habeas corpus 
case to the district court for further action 
consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, C. J., and STEWART and HOWE, 
JJ., concur. 
MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments, 
but died before the opinion was filed. 
Leo DURAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Lawrence MORRIS, Warden, Utah State 
Prison, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 16871. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 21, 1981. 
Prisoner filed petition for writ of habe-
as corpus alleging that prison officials vio-
but not the prisoner. 2 Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 210 (Am.ed. 1847). 
8. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571, 5 S.Ct 
1050, 1053, 29 L.Ed. 277 (1885). 
9. Compare, e. g., Hafen v. Morris, Utah, 632 
P.2d 875 (1981). 
l \ a case such as this one, which involves a First Degree 
2 Felony charge. The proper avenue of appeal on the 
3 issue raised here would have been to the Supreme 
4 Court; interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of 
5 this State. 
6| What the Defense is asking this Court to 
7 do in connection with its motion to quash the bind 
8 over is to review evidence and make a determination as 
9 to whether a lower court has correctly assessed that 
10 evidence. It's quintessentially an appellate review 
11 function. And in the State of Utah today, as opposed 
12 to two and a half, three years ago, that's simply 
13 something that this Court is not authorized to do. 
14 And so for those reasons, Your Honor, 
15 the State would respectfully ask that the motion be 
16 str icken. 
17 THE COURT: Ms. Remal? 
18 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I think the 
19 problem that we have is that unfortunately cases and 
20 statutes have clear-cut language, but the functions of 
21 the courts are not always clear-cut. It's certainly 
22| correct, as Mr. Matheson states, that the 1986 
revisions of the statute take away this Court's 
appellate function by and large. And were we here 





X misdemeanor from the Circuit Court, certainly this 
2 would be the wrong forum for that# we should be in the 
3 Court of Appeals. 
4 The problem is that what the Circuit 
5 Court does in the processing of a felony case is not 
6 the same as what they do in making a final order or 
7 final conviction, for instance, in a misdemeanor case 
8 or final order on a civil case that they have 
9 jurisdiction over. 
10 They provide a function that is part and 
11 parcel of the felony process, but it does not produce 
12 a final order or a final judgment or a final 
13 conviction. They simply make a preliminary ruling. 
14 As the function states itself, it is a preliminary 
15 hearing. They don't make a final ruling. And as we 
16 all know, normally, in order for an appellate court to 
17 perform its appellate function, there has to be a 
18 final ruling. 
19 I would suggest to the Court that 
20 J frankly what the — what we are asking you to do here 
21 is more in the function of an extraordinary writ. And 
22 for that reason -- I apologize for not getting this to 
23 you before. Our copy machine is broken, so I had to 
24 run down this morning and get it. 
25 In a 1987 case called H-errrmrer--v-.--ff-rn-trh 
7 1-4-89 
jl g-i-rctriir-CtniT-t. the circumstances are very different. 
2 It's a petition for an extraordinary writ to the 
3 District Court from a bondsman whose bonding authority 
4 was ruled upon by the Circuit Court* And the Circuit 
5 Court initially raised a jurisdictional issue 
S\ indicating that the District Court had no authority to 
7 deal with that issue. And the Court -- and the 
8 Appellate Court in the case indicated that 
9 extraordinary writs is something that the District 
10 Court still has despite the changes made in the 
11 statutory authority in 1986. 
12 And I would indicate that since what the 
13 Circuit Court does in processing felony cases is 
14 something that's really sort of a hybrid — it's sort 
15 of a unique position. They don't produce a final 
16 ruling -- that really what we are asking the Court to 
17 do is more in the nature of an extraordinary writ. 
18 The problem also is that the combination 
19 of the statutes and the case law puts someone like 
20 Mr. Quas, or any Defendant who is contesting the --
21 contesting what the Circuit Court did during the 
22 preliminary hearing, between a rock and a hard place. 
23 Because if the Court says it's an appellate function, 
24 then we are in the wrong place. 



























go through the trial without having filed a motion to 
quash the bind over to the District Court, you've 
waived any complaint about any defects that you claim 
happened in the Circuit Court. We filed this because 
we are trying to preserve whatever rights Mr. Quas 
has. 
The Martinez Case was decided after the 
1986 revisions to the statutes. It clearly states 
that the District Court has the power to quash the 
bind over. And Judge Russon's decision -- also, 
certainly not binding on this Court -- in part states 
that the District Court also clearly has at least some 
limited power to review what happens in the court 
below at the preliminary hearing. 
If this Court were to follow what Mr. 
Matheson argues, then you would also have to indicate 
that Judge Russon was wrong. Because he indicates 
that at least in a limited capacity the District Court 
does have the power to review at least procedural 
matters arising out of a preliminary hearing. 
I think that the other thing is just the 
public policy behind what Mr. Matheson is arguing 
versus what we are arguing. It seems like it just 
makes more sense in terms of the efficiency of the 
Court's time and energy of all the parties involved 
9 1-4-89 
1 and perhaps a speedy trial issue down the road, if we 
2 allow the District Court to have the power to review 
3 the bind over decision of the Circuit Court at this 
4 time rather than waiting until after a trial# going to 
5 the Appellate Court and then if • the Appellate Court 
6 finds that there is a problem# coming back here one, 
7 two, three years down the line -- so, I think in terms 
8 of public policy, it also makes sense that this Court 
9 have the power to review that. 
10 I would submit it on that basis, Your 
11 Honor• 
12 THE COURT: Anything f u r t h e r ? 
13 MR. MATHESON: J u s t a b r i e f r e p l y , Your 
14 Honor. 
15 The point about bind over not being a 
16 final order I think really is of no moment on this 
17 particular issue. The State has taken the position of 
18 what you are being asked to do is conduct an 
19 interlocutory appeal, and there wouldn't be a final 
20 order or judgment in a case such as this until after 
21 the trial and verdict and judgment have been entered. 
22 And there are interlocutory appeals, as you know, 
23 during the course of proceedings in this court, as 
24 well. 
25 As to the extraordinary writ argument, 
10 1-4-89 
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Harlan Burns, J., of maintaining a mobile 
home as a residence in an unauthorized 
zone in violation of city code, and he appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that 
where issue whether defendant's constitu-
tional right to counsel was denied by virtue 
of trial court's refusal to permit a lay per-
son, not a member of the bar, to represent 
him was not raised at trial level, matter 
could not be raised for first time on appeal. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Criminal Law <§=> 1035(7) 
Where no issue as to whether defend-
ant was denied his constitutional right to 
counsel by virtue of trial court's refusal to 
permit a lay person, not a member of the 
bar, to represent him was raised at trial 
level, matter could not be raised for first 
time on appeal. U.C.A.1953, 78-5-14, 78-
51-25; Const, art. 8, § 9. 
Gubler, pro se. 
John W. Palmer, St. George City Atty., 
St. George, for plaintiff and respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
Defendant appeals a District Court trial 
de novo l conviction of maintaining a mobile 
home as a residence in an unauthorized 
zone in violation of the St. George City 
Code.2 
The defendant was initially tried and con-
victed by a jury in the City Court of St. 
George, was granted a new trial and was 
again convicted after a jury trial. 
On the day scheduled for trial in the 
District Court defendant appeared pro se, 
announced he was prepared to proceed and 
the jury trial ensued and concluded with a 
conviction. At no time during the proceed-
1. Section 78-5-14, U C A , 1953, Article VIII, 
Section 9, Constitution of Utah. 
2. Section 5-7-3, St George City Code. 
ings was a constitutional issue framed, 
presented to the court or ruled upon. How-
ever, on appeal here, defendant asserts he 
was denied the right to counsel by virtue of 
the court's refusal to permit a lay person, 
not a member of the bar, to represent him.3 
This court has had this issue of right to 
appeal before it a number of times4 and 
most recently in State v. Sheldon* Vernal 
City v. Critton* and in Salt Lake City v. 
Perkins,7 all of which are dispositive. 
There having been no constitutional issue 
raised in the District Court, the decision of 
that court is final and not reviewable here. 
Appeal dismissed. No costs awarded. 
ELLETT, C. J , and CROCKETT, MAU-
GHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Walter B. KELBACH and Myron D. 
Lance, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 15060. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 9, 1977. 
Defendants were convicted before the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Bryant H. Croft, J., of murder in the first 
degree, and they appealed. The Supreme 
Court, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297, af-
4. Beginning with* Salt Lake City v Lee, 49 
Utah 197, 161 P 926 
5. Utah, 545 P 2d 513 (1976) 
3. See Section 78-51-25. U.C.A.. 1953 allowing fi l l t *h 5fi5 P9H *n« ^Q77^ 
STATE v. KELBACH 
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firmed, and defendants appealed The 
United States Supreme Court vacated judg-
ment insofar as it left undisturbed death 
penalty imposed and remanded case.. The 
Supreme Court, 559 P.2d 543, then remand-
ed case to the district court for further 
proceedings in accordance with law. On 
remand, the district court sentenced de-
fendants to life imprisonment instead of 
death, and the State appealed. On motion 
to dismiss appeal, the Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that sentence was not 
"order made after judgment" from which 
State, which had no right to appeal except 
Robert B. Hansen, William T. Evans, Wil-
liam W. Barrett, R. Paul VanDam, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff-appellant. 
James R. Soper, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and respondents. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
The state appeals to challenge the propri-
ety of sentencing the defendants to life 
imprisonment instead of death upon their 
conviction of first degree murder. Defend-
ants move to dismiss on the ground that no 
as expressly provided by statute, could ap- s u c h aPP^ by t h e s t a t e » authorized by 
peal. 
Motion to dismiss appeal granted. 
Ellett,. C. J., filed dissenting opinion. 
L Criminal Law *=> 1024(1) 
Sentence of life imprisonment imposed 
upon defendants, instead of death, upon 
their conviction of first-degree murder, was 
not "order made after judgment," within 
•meaning of statute providing that appeal 
may be taken by state from order made 
after judgment affecting substantial rights 
hi the state, from which state, which has no 
right to appeal except as expressly provided 
by statute, could appeal. U.C.A.1953, 77-
35-1 et seq., 77-39-4. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Z Courts <&~90(6) 
As a general proposition law as estab-
lished should remain so until changed by 
legislature, prerogative of which is to make 
and change the law; however, this does not 
Tnean to say that error in judge-made law 
icannot be remedied but rather in such cir-
cumstances court undoubtedly can and 
should correct it. 
£ Courts *=> 100(1) 
B Statutes *=>267(1) 
Any change in law that state has no 
fright to appeal except as expressly provided 
|or statute, whether by legislative act or by 
judicial decision, should have only prospec-
tive, effect U.CJL1953, 77-39-4; Const. 
* t 8, § 9, 
law. 
[1] Defendants argue that the only ap-
peal permitted the state in criminal cases is 
as stated in Sec 77-39-4, U.C.A.1953: 
Appeal by state, in what cases.—An 
appeal may be taken by the state: 
(1) From a judgment of dismissal in 
favor of the defendant upon a motion to 
quash the information or indictment 
(2) From an order arresting judgment 
(3) From an order made after judg-
ment affecting the substantial rights of 
the state. 
(4) From an order of the court direct-
ing the jury to find for the defendant 
If we accept defendants' premise: that the 
only authorization for an appeal by the 
state must derive from the above-quoted 
statute, the right of appeal must be found 
in subsection (3). 
The question then arises: whether the 
sentence is "an order made after judg-
ment," as distinguished from the judgment 
itself. It is true that the jury verdict and 
the judgment entered thereon, whether of 
guilty or not guilty, is sometimes spoken of 
as "the judgment" in a criminal case.'- If 
that constituted the whole judgment, then 
the sentence might be regarded as "an or-
der made after judgment" But it is also 
true that until the court acts upon the 
verdict and pronounces sentence upon the 
defendant there is no burden imposed about 
which to complain and take an appeal. Ao-
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cordingly, it is commonly understood and 
accepted that the sentence is that which 
aggrieves him and is regarded either as the 
judgment or an essential part thereof. 
Consistent with this is the manner in which 
the term is used in Chapter 35 of Utah Code 
Ann. 1953, entitled "The Judgment" 
Section 77-35-1 provides: 
Time for pronouncing.—After a plea or 
verdict of guilty . . . the court 
must appoint a time for pronouncing 
judgment . . [i. e., the sentence.] 
Further in accord with the idea that the 
sentence is not "an order made after judg-
ment" is the statement in our case of State 
v. Fedder:l 
. sentence is ordinarily synony-
mous with judgment, and denotes the 
action of a court of criminal jurisdiction 
formally declaring to the accused the le-
gal consequences of the guilt which he 
has confessed or of which he has been 
convicted. [All emphasis herein is add-
ed.] 
We are not aware of, nor have we been 
shown, any adjudication to the effect that a 
sentence is such "an order made after judg-
ment;" and it does not seem reasonable to 
suppose that the appeal allowed in the 
above-quoted statute was intended to be to 
the sentence imposed, or it could have plain-
ly so stated. 
The state makes the alternative argu-
ment: that if the quoted statute does not 
authorize the appeal, it should be allowed 
upon the ground set forth in the dissent in 
the case of State v. Davenport,2 by myself 
and joined in by Chief Justice Ellett. 
Therein I set forth as persuasively as I 
could the proposition that the above-quoted 
statute is permissive only; and that in any 
event it could not supersede the general 
grant of the right of appeal under Section 9 
of Article VIII of our Constitution. Where-
fore, the state should have such right to 
correct errors or settle questions of law 
whenever it is deemed that the public inter-
1. 1 Utah 2d 117, 262 P.2d 753. 
est so requires. (Absent, of course, consid-
erations of double jeopardy.) However, de-
spite that effort to so persuade this court, it 
rejected that proposition and ruled to the 
contrary: that is, that the state has no 
right to appeal except as expressly provided 
in the above-quoted statute.3 It is impor-
tant to have in mind that that was the 
established law of this jurisdiction at all 
times material to this case, and when the 
sentence complained of was imposed; and 
when this appeal was filed. 
[2] As a general proposition the law as 
established should remain so until changed 
by the legislature, whose prerogative it is to 
make and to change the law. This does not 
mean to say that where there is judge-made 
law, which is later observed to be clearly in 
error, that such error should be so cast in 
cement that it cannot be remedied. In such 
circumstances the court undoubtedly can 
and should correct it. 
[3] But more important than any of the 
above is the oft proclaimed salutary princi-
ple: that ours is a government of laws and 
not of men. Accordingly, the law should 
not be changed simply because of the will 
or desire of judges as to what the law is or 
ought to be. Much less so, should it be so 
changed during the course of a particular 
proceeding to have a retroactive effect 
thereon. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
change the state advocates would vindicate, 
the position taken in the dissent referred to, 
to so rule in this case retroactively would 
violate what we regard as a higher princi-
ple: that of honoring the established law. 
If there is to be such a change in the law, 
whether by legislative act or by judicial 
decision, it seems that it should have only 
prospective effect and that fairness and 
good conscience require that it should not 
be applied retroactively to adversely affect 
rights as they existed at the time a particu-
lar controversy arose.4 
4. That such a change is sometimes made and 
Cite as 569 
To be mentioned in passing is a question 
which has been spoken of as of some con-
cern: does the imposition of a sentence for 
life, rather than the death penalty, adverse-
ly affect the substantial rights of the state. 
However, we do not think it is of control-
ling importance, but have assumed that it 
does, and have set that question aside, in 
order to deal with what we regard as more 
important problems. 
There is a further proposition which we 
think has a legitimate bearing upon our 
action on this motion: due to the multi-
faced opinion of the United States Supreme 
Court in the case of Furman v. Georgia,5 
and subsequent adjudications,6 there has de-
veloped a great deal of consternation and 
confusion about the death penalty. Other 
cases are pending before the courts and it is 
not clear what useful purpose could be 
served by adding another until the law is 
more clearly defined and settled in that 
area. Moreover, it appears that these de-
fendants were involved in a series of kill-
ings which could hardly have been more 
fiendish or diabolical. Without making any 
suggestion with respect thereto, it is point-
ed out that it is up to the officials charged 
with that responsibility as to further prose-
cutions against the defendants, if and when 
they think a useful purpose would be served 
thereby. 
It should be noted that this discussion 
deals solely with the motion to dismiss the 
state's appeal; and that it does not reach 
nor have any relationship whatsoever to the 
lawfulness of the defendants' conviction, 
which has been heretofore dealt with,7 nor 
with the question of the death penalty. 
On the basis of the record presented on 
this motion and what has been said herein, 
P^dllOO 
we have concluded to grant the motion to 
dismiss the appeal. 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., 
concur. 
ELLETT, Chief Justice, (dissenting). 
The opinions of the author in the main 
opinion regarding appeals by the state, un-
like swiss cheese, do not improve with age. 
His dissent in the case of State v. Daven-
port1 set forth the law correctly and he 
should have remained faithful to the correct 
principles set forth therein and should not 
have changed his vote 'simply because this 
Court heretofore made an error. 
There should be a better reason for fol-
lowing an erroneous holding than the idea 
that once we make an error, it must be 
perpetuated until the legislature spends its 
time to correct our mistakes. We should 
correct our own errors as soon as the occa-
sion arises when we are convinced that an 
error has been made. I would allow the 
appeal to stand. 
Even if the appeal were not permitted by 
the constitution,2 the judgment of the dis-
trict court cannot be allowed to stand. On 
January 18, 1977, this Court remanded this 
case to the district court "for further pro-
ceedings in accordance with the law."3 I 
dissented to the language used in the order 
of remand and thought we should tell the 
trial judge what the law was. His Honor, 
the district judge, was told to proceed in 
accordance with law. This he failed to do, 
and we should remand to have him comply 
with our order. 
His failure to act in accordance with the 
law stems from the fact that the sentence 
to be imposed upon those guilty of murder 
53 S.Ct 145, 77 L.Ed. 360, cited in our case of 7. Conviction affirmed, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 297. 
P.2d 389. 
5. 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346. 
6. Gregg v! Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 
49 L.Ed.2d 859; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 
242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913; Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 
929. 
1. 30 Utah 2d 298, 517 P.2d 544 (1973). 
2. Article VIII, Sec. 9 provides: "From all final 
judgments of the district courts, there shall be 
a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. . ." 
3- Utah, 559 P.2d 543 (1977). 
1104 Utah 569 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
and the first degree was death unless the 
jury trying the case made a recommenda-
tion of leniency which was not done in this 
case. Here, the defendants committed a 
series of murders, and after the decision in 
Furman v. Georgia4, was handed down, 
they appeared on national television and 
gleefully admitted the killings, stating that 
they would kill more if and when they got 
out of prison. 
The defendants had been sentenced to be 
shot, but the execution date was postponed 
by the United States Supreme Court. The 
case was remanded by that Court to the 
Utah Supreme Court to consider the case in 
the light of Stewart v. Massachusetts} In-
stead of doing that, the majority of this 
Court simply remanded the matter to the 
district court. 
Since Utah has never had a racial prob-
lem (only one black man has been executed 
in Utah since statehood in 1896), it cannot 
be said that we are governed by the Stew-
art or the Furman cases. Therefore, the 
only lawful penalty to be made is that of 
death. The trial court should have fixed a 
new date for the execution if it proceeded 
according to law as it was directed to do. 
However, the court did not proceed accord-
ing to law; it imposed a sentence which 
cannot be found in the statutes, to wit: life 
imprisonment. 
To follow the main opinion in this case is 
to let two cold-blooded murderers avoid the 
lawful sentence that they were originally 
given. If the state is not permitted to 
appeal the erroneous sentence imposed, the 
matter ends here until the defendants seek 
relief by way of habeas corpus on the 
ground that there is no penalty under the 
law for retaining them in prison. It would 
be better to allow the appeal and have a 
decision on the matter in the light of the 
Stewart case as the Supreme Court of the 
United States requested, than to merely 
remand for the court to follow the law. 
It appears to me that this Court is supine-
ly shirking its responsibility if we let the 
sentence stand as made. It is no excuse to 
refuse to stand firm on the principles of 
this case by saying that the prosecuting 
attorney can bring more cases of first de-
gree murder against the defendants/ We 
should do our duty, and if any court is to 
say that the penalty provided by law in this 
case is invalid and that these killers are to 
be freed, let it be some court other than our 
own. 
Jean EHNINGER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Ronald C. EHNINGER, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 14878, 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 13, 1977. 
Wife sued for divorce. The District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder, 
J., granted divorce and awarded $4,000 as 
property settlement in lieu of alimony and 
husband, appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that: (1) although parties 
had been married only about a year and 
both were employed, award of money to 
wife was not improper, where marriage had 
been second for husband and first for 
younger wife, husband was awarded most 
important asset and he had income of 
$1,300 per month and wife $500; and (2) 
wife was justified in her request for further 
award of attorney fee. 
Affirmed, but remanded for determina-
tion of attorney fee. 
Wilkins and Hall, JJ., concurred in re-
sult. 
